Contribution in Missouri-Procedure and Defenses under the New Rule by Horn, Robert A.
Missouri Law Review 
Volume 44 
Issue 4 Fall 1979 Article 4 
Fall 1979 
Contribution in Missouri-Procedure and Defenses under the New 
Rule 
Robert A. Horn 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert A. Horn, Contribution in Missouri-Procedure and Defenses under the New Rule, 44 MO. L. REV. 
(1979) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/4 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of 





UNDER THE NEW RULE
I. Introduction ...................................... 691
II. Developm ent ..................................... 692
III. Procedural Problems: The Who, What, When, and
How of Contribution ............................. 697
A. Allocation in the OriginalAction ................. 697
1. Impleader ................................ 699
2. Counterclaims ............................ 701
3. Cross-Claims .............................. 702
B. Allocation in a Separate Action .................. 706
IV. Substantive Problems: Defenses to an Action for
Contribution ................................... 709
A. Defenses Based on the Relationship Between the
Defendants ................................... 709
B. Defenses Based on Circumstances or Relationships
Existing Between the Plaintiff and One of the Joint
Tortfeasors ................................... 711
1. Statute of Limitations ...................... 712
2. Settlem ents ............................... 714
3. Family Immunity .......................... 719
4. Workmen's Compensation .................. 720
V. Conclusion ....................................... 726
I. INTRODUCTION
Contribution is a means of equitably apportioning the liability arising
from a particular tort among those wrongdoers responsible for the tort's
occurrence.1 In the past in Missouri, when a tortfeasor compensated the
1. Panichella v. Pennsylvania R.R., 167 F. Supp. 345, 351-52 (W.D. Pa.
1958); Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 257 N.W.2d 679, 688 (Minn. 1977);
Missouri Dist. Tel. Co. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 338 Mo. 692, 693, 93
S.W.2d 19, 23 (En Banc 1934); Mong v. Hershberger, 200 Pa. Super. Ct. 68, 71,
186 A.2d 427, 429 (1962); 18 AM. JUR. 2d Contribution § 1 (1975).
1
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plaintiff for his loss, the tortfeasor's right to obtain contribution from
others responsible for the loss was limited to the situation where there was a
judgment entered against joint tortfeasors. 2 In a sweeping opinion, the
Missouri Supreme Court in Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Whitehead &
Kales Co. 3 removed this obstacle confronting a defendant who sought to
have others share in paying for a loss for which they were also responsible.
The court created a contribution system based on relative fault, in effect a
system of comparative negligence between joint tortfeasors.
This comment will examine the parameters of the new Missouri rule
on contribution and its effect on non-contractual indemnity. The new rule
is a major step in establishing a realistic and equitable means of
distributing loss. However, the application of the rule is fraught with pro-
blems and unanswered questions. The focus of this comment will be to
discern the substantive and procedural implications of the rule. Since the
new rule has no effect on the injured party's rights as they existed prior to
the decision, emphasis will be on the problems confronting the tortfeasor
who seeks contribution and the problems confronting the tortfeasor from
whom contribution is sought. In order to more fully understand and ap-
preciate the new rule, it will be helpful to briefly survey the common law
origins of the rule, its acceptance and application in the United States, and
the development of the rule in Missouri.
II. DEVELOPMENT
Contribution and indemnity developed from equitable principles of
unjust enrichment and restitution .4 At common law there were few excep-
tions to the right of a defendant to seek contribution or indemnity from
another who was partly or wholly responsible for the plaintiff's injury. In
the case of contribution it was thought that a person who discharged a
common liability was entitled to recover from another who was also liable
on that part of the liability for which he was responsible. 5 On the other
2. RSMo § 537.060 (1978). See Crouch v. Tourtelot, 350 S.W.2d 799 (Mo.
En Banc 1961).
3. 566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. En Banc 1978).
4. Comment, Products Liability-Non-Contractual Indemnity-The Ef-
fect of the Active-Passive Negligence Theory in Missouri, 41 Mo. L. REv. 382,
383 (1976).
5. The right of contribution grows out of the relation of the parties
to the obligation or from the nature of the relation between
them and out of what they do. It is almost universally agreed
that the doctrine of contribution is founded not upon contract
but upon principles of equity and natural justice, which require
that persons under a common burden shall bear it in equal pro-
portions and one party shall not be subject to bear more than
his just share to the advantage of his co-obligors. It is equally
true, therefore, that the doctrine of contribution is founded
upon morality, since no one ought to profit by another man's
[Vol. 44692
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hand, indemnity allows a tortfeasor to recover reimbursement from
another for the entire amount of the loss. 6
The principal exception to the common law rule allowing contribution
was that there was no contribution among wilful tortfeasors. 7 Initially,
courts in the United States applied the rule only to intentional conduct;8
however, due to misinterpretation of the common law rule, 9 the bar on
contribution soon became expanded to include within its scope mere
negligent acts. 10 Negligent joint tortfeasors became subject to the same
harsh common law rule denying contribution which was originally intend-
ed to include only intentional torfeasors.
Many courts, including Missouri, expanded the concept of implied in-
demnity in an attempt to circumvent the harsh rule denying contribution
among joint tortfeasors.I If a tortfeasor could show that his negligence
loss where he himself has incurred a like responsibility.
18 AM. JUR. 2d Contribution § 4 (1965). See also W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS 310 (4th ed. 1971); Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tort-
feasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130 (1932).
6. The right to indemnity typically arises from contract, either expressed
or implied. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 310. Indemnity allows a party to recover
reimbursement from another for the entire amount of the loss rather than sharing
the loss as is done with contribution. Originally, indemnity could be obtained
only when the liability of the prospective indemnitee arose as a matter of law,
either through express agreement or, more commonly, vicarious liability. Thus a
master who is held liable for the torts of his servant can seek indemnity from the
servant because as between them the master is without fault. Comment, Con-
tribution Among Tortfeasors- The Need for Clarification, 8 J. MAR. J. PRAC. &
PROC. 75, 79 (1974).
7. Pearson v. Skelton, 150 Eng. Rep. 533 (1836); Betts v. Gibbins, 111
Eng. Rep. 22 (1834); Adamson v. Jarvis, 130 Eng. Rep. 603 (1827);
Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
8. See cases collected in W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 306 nn.45 & 46.
9. Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Charged for
Negligence-Merryweatherv. Nixan, 12 HARV. L. REV. 176, 177 (1898). See also
Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d at 469.
10. See cases collected in W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 306 n.47. It has been
asserted that the reason courts in the United States began applying the rule to
negligent tortfeasors is adoption of procedural codes which allowed the conve-
nient combination of many parties and issues in one trial but which failed to
recognize that at common law "the rules of law regarding 'joint' tortfeasors did
not necessarily apply to tortfeasors who could now be 'joined' procedurally in the
same action." Comment, Contribution Among Tortfeasors-The Need for
Clarification, 8 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 75, 78 (1.974).
11. It has been observed "that the doctrine of indemnity evolved in the un-
natural surroundings of an inflexible rule against contribution and consequently
was overextended as a device for reallocation of loss." Comment, Toward a
Workable Rule of Contribution in the Federal Courts, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 123,
126 (1965). "Despite the early common law 'rule,' we-do permit indemnity to some
extent between non-contractual concurrent tortfeasors in Missouri." Missouri
Pac. R.R. v. Whitehead & Kales, Co., 566 S.W.2d at 469. See also Comment,
Products Liability-Non- Contractual Indemnity-The Effect of the Active-
Passive Negligence Theory in Missouri, 41 MO. L. REV. 382, 384 (1976).
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was of a different character than that of his fellow tortfeasor, he could ob-
tain indemnity from the other for the entire amount of the loss.1 2 Thus, a
tortfeasor whose negligence was said to be passive could recover from the
tortfeasor whose negligence was active."1 Likewise, one who was secondari-
ly liable to the injured party would be entitled to indemnity from one
primarily liable.14 These labels proved to be little more than artificial
distinctions made necessary by an inflexible rule against contribution. 15
They allowed a court to rationalize its decision in a particular case but
often proved to be inadequate precedent for subsequent decisions. It
seems that many cases simply involved a judicial choice of the lesser of two
evils: either imposing the whole loss on a tortfeasor who was unable to ob-
tain contribution, or allowing him to shift the entire burden to another
who was deemed to be more at fault.1 6 The "all or nothing" approach of
the indemnity exception was rationalized on the ground that the truly
culpable party should not be allowed to escape liability while the
technically culpable party was forced to pay the plaintiffs entire loss.'
7
The impetus for expanding the concept of indemnity through ar-
tificial conceptual distinctions has been lessened due to recent legislative
and judicial pronouncements which have virtually eradicated the no con-
tribution rule. Over forty jurisdictions now allow contribution between
joint tortfeasors to some extent; the majority of these jurisdictions have
some statutory basis for their rule.' 8 Many of the statutes are based on the
12. Implied indemnification is dependent on the character of the
negligence whereas contribution depends on the difference in the degrees of
negligence between the tortfeasors. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Whitehead & Kales,
Co., 566 S.W.2d at 472. See also Crouch v. Tourtelot, 350 S.W.2d 799, 805 (Mo.
En Banc 1961); State ex rel. Laclede Gas Co. v. Godfrey, 468 S.W.2d 693, 698
(St. L. Mo. App. 1971); Coccia, Getting Others To Assume or Share the Loss: A
Discussion of Indemnity and Contribution, 1976 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 179, 184;
Greenstone, Spreading the Loss-Indemnity, Contribution, Comparative
Negligence and Subrogation, 13 FORUM 266, 268 (1977); Comment, Pro-
cedure-Third Party Practice-Non-Contractual Indemnification, 28 MO. L.
REV. 307, 309 (1963).
13. See, e.g., Kansas City S. Ry. v. Payway Feed Mills, Inc., 338 S.W.2d 1, 7
(Mo. 1960).
14. See, e.g., Hales v. Green Colonial, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 738, 740 (W.D.
Mo. 1975), modified on other grounds, Hales v. Monroe, 544 F.2d 331 (8th Cir.
1976).
15. As pointed out by the court in Missouri Pacific, the distinction between
the terms active and passive has become so blurred that the right to obtain indem-
nity depends more on phraseology than on the actual responsibility of each tort-
feasor for the plaintiff's loss. Thus, the rationale for allowing indemnity fails to be
persuasive since there are no clear guidelines for determining when one is only
technically responsible for the loss. 566 S.W.2d at 471.
16. Coccia, Getting Others to Assume or Share the Loss: A Discussion of In-
demnity and Contribution, 1973 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 179, 187.
17. Id.
18. ALASKASTAT.§§ 09.16.010-.060 (1973); ARK.STAT.ANN.§§ 34-1001
694 [Vol. 44
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Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.1 9 An increasing number
base contribution on relative fault; however, the majority simply divide
the loss equally among the tortfeasors. 20 A few states have refused, despite
the trend to the contrary, to abandon the no contribution rule. 21
In Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., the
to 1009 (1962) (apportionment based on relative fault); CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE§
875 (Supp. 1971); DEL. CODEANN. tit. 10, §§ 6301-6308 (1953) (relative fault);
GA. CODE ANN. § 105-2012 (1968); HAW. REV. LAWS §§ 663-11 to 16 (1968)
(relative fault); IDAHO CODE § 6-803 (Supp. 1978); KY. REV. STAT. § 412.030
(1969); LA. CODECIV. PRO. ANN. arts. 1111-1116 (1960); ME. REV. STATANN.
tit. 14, § 156 (1978) (relative fault); MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, §§ 16-24 (1968);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 1-4 (1968); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2925
(1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 548.19 (1946) (relative fault); MISS. CODEANN. §
335.5 (1956); RSMO § 537.060 (1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 58-607.2(1)
(Supp. 1977) (relative fault); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2A:53A-1 to -5 (1951) (relative
fault); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-1-11 to -18 (1953); N.Y. CiV. PRAc.§ 141 (Supp.
1978) (relative fault); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-1 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE §§
32-38-01 to -04 (1960); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.31 (Supp. 1978) (relative
fault); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.440 (1975) (relative fault); PA. STAT. tit. 12, §§
2082-2089 (1967); R.I. GEN. LAWSANN. §§ 10-6-1 to -11 (1969) (relative fault);
S.D. CODE§§ 15-8-11 to -22 (1967) (relative fault); TENN.CODEANN.§ 23-3101
(Supp. 1978); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (1964) (relative fault); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-27-39 (1953) (relative fault); W. VA. CODEANN. §§ 55-7-12 to
-13 (1966); WIS. STAT. §§ 113.01-.05 (1957) (relative fault); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§
1-1-110 to -113 (1977) (relative fault). Four states have adopted comparative
negligence statutes which do away with joint and several liability. In these states,
a tortfeasor is only liable for his allocated share, thus there is no need for con-
tribution. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(d) (Weeks 1976); NEV. REV. STAT. §
41-141(3)(a)(b) (1972); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:7-a (Supp. 1975); VT.
STAT. ANN. § 1036 (1959). The District of Columbia and Iowa also allow con-
tribution, having never adopted the common law rule against contribution. See
Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800,
77 N.W.2d 23 (1956). Nebraska also allows contribution. Royal Indem. Co. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 193 Neb. 752, 229 N.W.2d 183 (1975).
19. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT (1939. and 1955
versions). The 1939 version had an optional provision permitting apportionment
based on relative fault of the tortfeasors. This provision was eliminated in the
1955 version and pro rata apportionment was adopted because, the Commis-
sioners said in their comments to § 2, the "exclusion of intentional, wilful, and
wanton actors from the right to contribution eliminates the better arguments for
a relative degree of fault rule."
20. See notes 18 & 19 supra.
21. Sherman Concrete Pipe Mach., Inc. v. Gadsden Concrete & Metal Pipe
Co., 335 So. 2d 125 (Ala. 1976); Holmes v. Hoemako Hosp., 117 Ariz. 403, 537
P.2d 477 (1978); Publix Cab Co. v. Fessler, 138 Colo. 547, 335 P.2d 865 (1959);
Fox v. Fox, 168 Conn. 592, 362 A.2d 854 (1975); National Trailer Convoy, Inc. v.
Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 434 P.2d 238 (Okla. 1967); Atlantic Coast Line R.R.
v. Whetstone, 243 S.C. 61, 132 S.E.2d 172 (1963).
5
Horn: Horn: Contribution in Missouri-Procedure and Defenses
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1979
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
Missouri Supreme Court addressed itself to the indemnity exception 22 and
the statutory joint judgment exception 23 to the rule denying contribution
among joint tortfeasors. It found both to be lacking in their protection of
the equitable principles embodied in the notion of contribution and in-
demnity. The court also found the active-passive negligence distinction to
be insufficient as a guide for determining when indemnity should be
allowed 24 since it often served to sanction inequities by requiring a tort-
feasor who was not fully responsible to bear the entire amount of the loss. 25
With respect to the statutory allowance of contribution among joint
judgment tortfeasors, the court recognized that it was insufficient and un-
fair because it allowed the plaintiff, by choosing who to sue, to determine
who would bear the entire financial responsibility for the tort. 26 Further-
more, the right to contribution did not automatically follow even where
there was a joint judgment. 27 Based on these conclusions, the court in
Missouri Pacific chose to totally abandon the no contribution rule. Con-
tribution is now freely allowed based on the relative fault of each tort-
feasor. 28 The judge or jury is to allocate the financial impact of the plain-
tiffs loss among all the tortfeasors regardless of whether each was sued by
the plaintiff. 29 The decision allows a defendant to use third-party practice
to bring into the original action any other joint tortfeasor who may be part-
ly or wholly responsible for the plaintiffs loss. The decision does not affect
the right of the plaintiff to sue whichever tortfeasors he chooses, nor does it
stop him from collecting the entire judgment from any defendant. 30 The
effect of the decision is limited to contribution and non-contractual in-
demnity; 31 it has no effect on contractual indemnity.
The court's decision raises but does not answer several questions and
some of the language lends itself to interpretations which could severely
restrict the application of the contribution rule. Chief among the
22. See notes 11-14 and accompanying text supra.
23. RSMo§ 537.060 (1978).
24. 566 S.W.2d at 470-71.
25. Id. at 472.
26. Id.
27. A joint judgment against two or more tortfeasors makes a prima facie
case of contribution, but contribution may, nevertheless, be denied if one of the
defendant's negligence is determined to be passive while the other's is determined
to be active. Hays-Fendler Constr. Co. v. Traroloc Invest. Co., 521 S.W.2d 171
(Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
28. "The principle of fairness imbedded within our law compels this adop-
tion of a system for the distribution of joint tort liability on the basis of relative
fault." 566 S.W.2d at 474.
29. The pros and cons of allocating negligence to nonparties is discussed in
notes 35-41 and accompanying text infra.
30. 566 S.W.2d at 473.
31. The court defined non-contractual indemnity as "indemnity between
joint tortfeasors culpably negligent, having no legal relation to each other. We do
not include indemnity which comes about by reason of contracts or by reason of
vicarious liability." 566 S.W.2d at 468 n.2.
696 [Vol. 44
6
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [1979], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/4
CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS
unanswered questions are: When can the action for contribution be
brought and what are the consequences of bringing the action at any par-
ticular time? How is the allocation of relative fault to be actually handled
in specific situations and what type of damages and expenses can be
allocated? Who can seek contribution? What is the effect of the party from
whom contribution is sought having a defense to a direct suit brought by
the plaintiff? These questions and other related problems are considered
in subsequent sections of this comment. The existing authority in Missouri
and other states, along with the language in Missouri Pacific, suggest
answers to many of the problems.
III. PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS:
THE WHO, WHAT, WHEN, AND HOW OF CONTRIBUTION
To allocate the liability of each joint tortfeasor for his relative share of
the plaintiffs total damage, 32 the judge or jury must be made aware of
those responsible for the damages. This requires the defendants to make
use of a variety of procedural tools to bring joint tortfeasors before the
court in the original action. If it is not possible to bring a joint tortfeasor
before the court, those sued may be able to present evidence of the absent
tortfeasor's responsibility for part of the plaintiff's loss, 33 or seek allocation
in a separate action after the plaintiff has obtained a judgment in the
original action.3 4 The availability of these alternatives makes it necessary
for a defendant in any action involving joint tortfeasors to initially deter-
mine when the allocation of fault will be made.
A. Allocation in the Original Action
There are two methods by which a defendant may have the relative
responsibility for the plaintiffs damages allocated in the original action.
First, it may be possible for him to merely present evidence showing the
facts and circumstances which make an absent tortfeasor responsible for
all or part of the plaintiffs loss, without formally making the tortfeasor a
32. The final bill that a defendant tortfeasor incurs and for which he can
claim contribution may be more than merely the plaintiffs verdict. A tortfeasor
may be able to get contribution for the reasonable expenses expended in in-
vestigating, defending or compromising the claim. See Laws v. Spain, 312 F.
Supp. 315 (E.D. Va. 1970). Missouri courts have previously held that a party en-
titled to indemnity may recover from the indemnitor court costs and attorney fees
if notice of the lawsuit and an opportunity to defend are given to the indemnitor.
This may lend support for applying the same rule to contribution cases. See, e.g.,
Bagby v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 491 F.2d 192 (8th Cir.
1974); Ward v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 379 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. 1964); Sears
Roebuck & Co. v. Peerless Prod. Inc., 539 S.W.2d 768 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976);
42 C.J.S. Indemnity § 24 (1965).
33. See notes 35-41 and accompanying text infra.
34. See notes 80-91 and accompanying text infra.
1979]
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party in the action. 35 In Missouri Pacific, the court stated that "a jury in
the same or separate trial ... should be charged with the responsibility for
determining a relative distribution of fault and liability for the damages
flowing from the tort. '36 The phrase "damages flowing from the tort"
arguably would allow the negligence of nonparties to be considered since
the negligence of nonparties could have contributed to the damages flow-
ing from the tort. However, another statement by the court concerning
general verdicts under Missouri Rule of Civil Procedure 71.01 indicates
that the negligence of nonparties is not to be considered. The court stated
that "the jury's verdict could assess damages, in accordance with the in-
structions, and award indemnity in an amount proportionate to the
relative fault of the parties. ,,3" Thus, it is not clear under Missouri Pacific
whether or not nonparty negligence can be considered. It seems
preferable, however, to place the responsibility on the plaintiff and the
defendant to bring before the court all those accountable for the loss in
order that considerations of nonparties' negligence can be avoided. 38 To
do otherwise may encourage an overuse of evidence of "phantom fault,"
especially by third party defendants since they are not jointly and severally
liable for the entire amount of the plaintiffs judgment.3 9 If evidence of
nonparty negligence is admissible, the amount of third party defendants'
35. For a discussion of jury considerations of negligence of nonparties, see
Campbell, Ten Years of Comparative Negligence, 1941 WIs. L. REV. 289;
Schwartz, Li v. Yellow Cab Company: A Survey of California Practice Under
Comparative Negligence, 7 PAC. L.J. 747, 762 (1976); Comment, Comparative
Negligence-A Look at the New Kansas Statute, 23 KAN. L. REv. 113, 128
(1974); Note, Multiple Party Litigation Under Comparative Negligence in
Kansas-Damage Apportionment as a Replacement for Joint and Several Lia-
bility, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 672, 678 (1977).
36. 566 S.W.2d at 474.
37. Id. at 473 (emphasis added).
38. Schwartz, supra note 35, at 762. Note, however, that the courts of
Wisconsin strongly advocate considering the negligence of nonparties. "[T]hejury must be given the opportunity to consider the possible negligence of all per-
sons, whether parties or not, who may have contributed to the total negligence."
Reddington v. Beefeaters Tables, Inc., 72 Wis. 2d 119, 125, 240 N.W.2d 363,
367 (1976). See also Heldt v. Nicholson Mfg. Co., 72 Wis. 2d 110, 240 N.W.2d
154 (1976); Connar v. West Shore Equip. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 42, 227 N.W.2d 660
(1975); Payne v. Bilco Co., 54 Wis. 2d 345, 195 N.W.2d 641 (1972). This strong
state policy may be explained in part by the use of the Pierringer release in
Wisconsin. The released tortfeasor is only excused from contribution to the ex-
tent of the released tortfeasor's equitable share as determined by the jury and the
released tortfeasor is, of course, not a party to the action. See discussion of the
Pierringer release at notes 133-36 and accompanying text infra.
39. 566 S.W.2d at 474. See also Berliner v. Kacov, 79 Misc. 2d 891, 894, 361
N.Y.S.2d 477, 479 (1974), where the court stated, "[i]t is highly significant that
the [third pirty defendants] did not become a party at the instance of the plain-
tiff. The plaintiff made no complaint against [them] and sought nothing from
them. Therefore, [they] did not become responsive to the judgment of the plain-
tiff and do not bear several liability with the [defendants]."
[Vol. 44
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liability can be reduced by the percentages of fault they can convince the
jury to assign to the "phantom defendant.'40 This makes the jury's task of
assigning responsibility for the loss difficult and may tempt them to impose
liability on a person who was never before the jury to present his case. 41
The second method by which a defendant may be able to have the
allocation of responsibility determined in the original action and, in addi-
tion, obtain a conditional judgment for contribution, 42 is by the pro-
cedural tools of impleader, cross-claims, and counterclaims.
1. Impleader
Impleader is used by a defendant when the plaintiff has not brought
suit against all joint tortfeasors. Missouri rule 52.11 allows a defendant to
serve a summons and petition on a third party who is or may be liable to
the defendant for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the
defendant. 43 The court in Missouri Pacific expressly sanctioned the use of
impleader as an appropriate means of bringing a co-tortfeasor before the
court in order to determine his relative responsibility. 44
The simplest impleader situation exists where P sues D1, and D, im-
pleads D2. It is illustrated as follows:
P----- D -------------- D2
Assume that P receives a $100,000 judgment. Subsequent to the im-
pleader, the plaintiff can collect his judgment only from D 1, unless he
chose to join D2 as a primary defendant in the action.4 5 DI, as a third party
40. For example, assume the plaintiff has sued defendants A andB and they
implead defendant C. Assume further that without the evidence of X's (phantom
defendant) negligence, the jury would allocate responsibility as A-(40%),
B-(40%) and C-(20%). With the evidence of X's negligence the jury may now
find that responsibility should be allocated as A-(35%), B-(35%), C-(15%) and
X-(15%). A and B would be required to absorb the 15% attributable to X
because they are jointly and severally liable for the entire amount of the plaintiffs
loss. C, who was not sued by the plaintiff, has his liability reduced from 20% to
15% by merely presenting evidence of X's negligence.
41. Gross v. Midwest Speedways, Inc., 81 Wis. 2d 129,145, 260 N.W.2d 36,
44 (1977) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
42. The actual right to obtain contribution from a co-tortfeasor does not
arise until the responsibility for the plaintiffs loss has been allocated and one of
the tortfeasors has paid more than his allocated share. See, e.g., Albert v. Dietz,
283 F. Supp. 854 (D. Hawaii 1968); Simon v. Kansas City Rug Co., 460 S.W.2d
596 (Mo. 1970); Markey v. Skog, 129 N.J. Super. 192, 322 A.2d 513 (1974).
Thus, while the allocation of responsibility will be determined in the original ac-
tion, a tortfeasor's right to obtain contribution is conditioned upon his paying
more than his share to the plaintiff.
43. Mo. R. CIV. P. 52.11.
44. 566 S.W.2d at 468.
45. Mo. R. CIV. P. 52.11 allows a plaintiff to "assert any claim against the
third-party defendant arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the sub-
1979] 699
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plaintiff, will have a judgment against D2 , the third party defendant, for
the amount of damages allocated to D 2 in the original action. The judg-
ment will be enforceable only after D, has paid more than his allocated
share to the plaintiff.46 Thus, if D1 and D2 were each found to be fifty per-
cent at fault, D1 can only collect from D2 for the amount D, pays in excess
of his $50,000 share of the plaintiffs judgment.
The situation may also arise where the plaintiff has sued two defen-
dants, one of whom uses an impleader action to bring in a third party. For
example, assume that the plaintiff has sued the drivers of two cars, D, and
D2 , alleging that their negligence combined to produce his injury. D2 im-
pleads D3 , the manufacturer of his automobile, asserting that D3 should be
liable for all or part of any amount D2 is found liable to the plaintiff. The




The question of whether DI can also implead D3, claiming D is liable for
all or part of the plaintiffs claim against D1, remains unclear. Rule 52.11
only expressly allows a defending party to serve a third party complaint on
a person not a party to the action. 47 Arguably, D 3 is already a party to the
action; thus, he could not be made a party defendant liable to D. It could
be argued, though, that D, should be allowed to implead D3 on the basis
that D3 need only not be a party to the original action against D1 and D 2.48
Although this question must await clarification in Missouri, denial of an
impleader action premised solely on a technical reading of rule 52.11 ap-
pears unjustifiable.
Another question which may arise in regard to the above example is
whether D3 could ever be allocated a greater share of the fault than D 2 who
impleaded him, assuming that D, does not implead D3 as a result of con-
scious choice or neglect, or when he cannot do so because of an immunity.
Could the jury come back with a verdict finding D, forty percent at fault,
D2 twenty percent at fault, and/D3 forty percent at fault? Rule 52.11 seems
to provide that the third party defendant, D3, cannot be liable for any
ject matter of the plaintiffs claim against the third-party plaintiff." It is clearly
optional with the plaintiff, though, whether to accept a third-party defendant
brought in by a third-party plaintiff. State ex rel. McClure v. Dinwiddie, 358 Mo.
15, 213 S.W.2d 126 (En Banc 1948).
46. See note 42 supra.
47. "[A] third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and petition to be
served upon a person not a party to the action. . . ." Mo. R. CIV. P. 52.11.
48. Novak v. Tigani, 49 Del. 106, 107, 110 A.2d 298, 299 (1954). The court
stated that "the phrase 'party to the action' as it appears in the first sentence of
[DEL. CODE ANN.] Civil Rule 14(a) should be construed to mean party to the
original action only." This rule is similar to Mo. R. Civ. P. 52.11.
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more than the plaintiffs claim against the third party plaintiff, D2 ;49 if D3
is allocated a greater percentage of the plaintiffs loss than D2, it would
seem inconsistent with this rule for D3 to pay for more of the plaintiffs loss
than D2. However, this apparent inconsistency can be resolved by noting
that the plaintiffs true claim against each tortfeasor be sues is the total
amount of the judgment rather than the allocated share of each. 50 As the
court in Missouri Pacific stated:
In a case such as we have before us, the jury should be instructed
that if they find the third party defendant did certain acts or omis-
sions and was thereby negligent and that the same directly con-
tributed to cause the injuries and damage to the original plaintiff,
then the jury should award the third party plaintiff such propor-
tion of the total sum paid by it to plaintiff as correspohds to the
degree of fault of the third party defendant.5
Therefore, it appears that D3 could be allocated a greater percent of the
fault than D., but not required to pay a greater amount of the damages
than D2. The approach taken by the New York courts simplifies this pro-
cedure by having a two stage instruction process. The liability of the
primary defendants, DI and D2, to plaintiff is first determined. The liabili-
ty of the third party defendent, D3, to the third party plaintiff, D2 , is then
found by determining what percentage of the third party plaintiffs
allocated share is attributable to the third party defendant. 52
2.. Counterclaims
A second tool available to a defendant seeking allocation in the
original action is a counterclaim asserted against one or more plaintiffs
who have joined their claims.5 3 In a contribution action, a defendant
asserting a counterclaim should charge that if the jury finds that the plain-
tiff against whom the counterclaim is asserted is contributorily negligent,
then that plaintiffs claim against the counterclaiming defendant must be
dismissed and the judge or jury should allocate the remaining plaintiffs
49. Mo. R. CIV. P. 52.11 provides that the third party defendant will be
liable to the third-party plaintiff "for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the
third-party plaintiff."
50. The court noted in Missouri Pacific that the plaintiff could collect the
entire amount of his judgment from any tortfeasor he sued. 566 S.W.2d at 473.
51. Id. at 472 (emphasis added).
52. In Liebman v. County of Westchester, 71 Misc. 2d 997, 337 N.Y.S. 2d
164 (1972), the two stage instruction process of the New York courts was used.
The plaintiff sued two defendants, D 1 and D 2 . D 2 impleaded D 3 and D 4 . Thejury found that the plaintiff should recover against D 1 and D2 and that D2 should
recover against D and D4 . The relative responsibility for the plaintiffs loss was
first apportioned between D 1 at 20% and D 2 at 80%. The responsibility of D 3
andD4 forD2 's allocated share of 80% was then determined to beD 2 at 10%, D 3
at 40% and D4 at 50%. D2 was thus able to recover 90% of his allocated share.
53. Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.32.
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damages between the defendant and the contributorily negligent
plaintiff.54
It is unclear whether these counterclaims fall under the compulsory
counterclaim rule. 5  A compulsory counterclaim under rule 55.32(a) is
"any claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has
against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence
that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim."5 6 At the time the
plaintiff's injury occurs a tortfeasor possesses an inchoate right to institute
suit to compel contribution.57 However, this inchoate right should not be
sufficient to qualify as a "claim" under the compulsory counterclaim rule.
The defendant's true claim to contribution from the contributorily
negligent plaintiff, even though inchoate as of the time of the original tort,
does not become a cause of action until the defendant has discharged more
than his share of the allocated fault.58 Thus, the counterclaim does not ap-
pear to fall within the language of the rule that requires the claim to exist
at the time of the serving of the pleading; the failure to assert it in the
original action should not constitute a waiver of the right to seek contribu-
tion in a separate action.
3. Cross-Claims
A party can assert a cross-claim against a co-party alleging that the co-
party may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of the-claim
asserted against the cross-claimant in the original action. 59 Since the party
against whom the cross-claim has been asserted is already a co-defendant,
it is unsettled whether there is any need for a cross-claim to be filed since
the court on its own initiative would seem to be able to instruct the jury to
apportion the damages between the defendants. This question of
automatic allocation has arisen in New York; the courts there have reach-
ed contradictory results.6 0
54. Lipson v. Gewirtz, 70 Misc. 2d 599, 603, 334 N.Y.S.2d 662, 665 (1972).
This would be the case only where, as in Missouri, contributory negligence is a
complete bar to a negligence action. See Chandler v. Mattox, 544 S.W.2d 85
(Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976).
55. Mo. R. CIv. P. 55.32(a). See also State ex rel. Davis v. Moss, 392 S.W.2d
260 (Mo. En Banc 1965).
56. Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.32(a).
57. Distefano v. Lamborn, 46 Del. 195, 81 A.2d 675 (1951). See 18 C.J.S.
Contribution § 4 (1975).
58. See note 42 supra.
59. Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.32(f). See Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Whitehead & Kales
Co., 566 S.W.2d 466, 473 (Mo. En Banc 1978).
60. For the proposition that allocation will be automatic in the absence of a
cross-claim, see Stein v. Whitehead, 40 App. Div. 2d 89, 337 N.Y.S.2d 821
(1972); Lipson v. Gewirtz, 70 Misc. 2d 599, 334 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1972). Contra,
Caucci v. Fesko, 349 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1973) (defendant waived his right to appor-
tionment where he failed to cross-'claim against a defendant and asserted no such
claim at trial or on appeal).
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The court in Missouri Pacific indicated that allocation would not be
automatic if cross-claims were not filed, because in the absence of cross-
claims the only issue resolved at trial is the joint liability of the defendants
to the plaintiff. 6' The court quoted from Kinloch Telephone Co. v. City of
St. Louis62 for the proposition that:
If A recovers judgment against B and C, upon a contract, which
judgment is paid by B, the liability of C to B in a subsequent action
for contribution is still an open question, because as to it no issue
was made or tried in the former suit. As between the several defen-
dants therein a joint judgment establishes nothing but their joint
liability to the plaintiff. Which of the defendants should pay the
entire debt, or what proportion each should pay in case each is
partly liable, is still unadjudicated.6 3
To insure allocation in the original action, then, the parties should file a
cross-claim.
Regardless of whether the filing or non-filing of a cross-claim should
determine when allocation is made, the failure to file the cross-claim may
create other undesirable consequences. 64 One possibility is that it may
preclude a defendant's ability to appeal a dismissal, directed verdict, judg-
ment n.o.v., or a judgment in favor of the other defendant. The inability
of a defendant to appeal and obtain reversal of a ruling or verdict ex-
onerating a co-defendant could nullify his ability to later obtain contribu-
tion from the exonerated defendant. This would result if a separate action
for contribution was not allowed, or if the exonerated defendant was able
to use res judicata as a defense in the separate action. To illustrate, assume
that a plaintiff had sued two defendants, D, and D 2, and neither defen-
dant filed a cross-claim for contribution. A verdict is returned for the
plaintiff against D1, but against the plaintiff for D2. The question that
arises is whether D1 can appeal the judgment in favor of D 2.
In at least one jurisdiction, D, is recognized as a party aggrieved by a
judgment or ruling in favor of D 2 and has been allowed the right to appeal
the ruling or judgment even in the absence of a cross-claim. 65 Another
jurisdiction, however, has held that the unsuccessful defendant cannot
challenge a verdict or ruling in favor of a co-defendant, holding that as
between the co-defendants a judgment for or against one of them does
nothing but establish their respective rights and liabilities toward the
plaintiff.66
61. 566 S.W.2d at 473-74.
62. 268 Mo. 485, 188 S.W. 182 (1916).
63.. Id. at 496-97, 188 S.W. at 184.
64. See Ausubel, The Impact of New York'sJudicially Created Loss Appor-
tionment Amongst Tortfeasors, 38 ALB. L. REV. 155, 162 (1974).
65. See Muggenburg v. Leighton, 240 Minn. 21, 60 N.W.2d 9 (1953);
Bocchi v. Karnstedt, 238 Minn. 257, 56 N.W.2d 628 (1953).
66. See North Shore Hosp. v. Martin, 344 So. 2d 256 (Fla. App. 1977).
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Missouri courts have long held that a defendant in the absence of a
cross-claim cannot complain of an error, ruling, or verdict in favor of his
co-defendant even though such error, ruling, or verdict may affect his
right to obtain contribution. 67 It is not clear if Missouri courts will con-
tinue to uphold this rule in light of the Missouri Pacific decision which
seeks to afford a greater amount of protection to the defendant's right to
obtain contribution than was previously available. In anticipation of a
change in the Missouri rule, a prudent defendant should file his cross-
claim in order to preserve his right to appeal a ruling favorable to his co-
defendant.
The inability of a defendant to appeal a verdict or ruling in favor of his
co-defendant will not be decisive if he is able to bring a separate action for
contribution. However, a separate action for contribution may be com-
pletely barred if the co-defendant is able to assert the defense of res
judicata. 6s
There is a split of authority on the availability of the defense of res
judicata to an exonerated defendant when no cross-claim was asserted
against him. The apparent majority hold that the defense is not
available. 69 In the absence of the filing of a cross-claim against a co-
defendant, it is held that the judgment in the prior action merely ad-
judicates the rights of the plaintiff against each defendant; it leaves unad-
judicated the rights of co-defendants as between themselves because those
rights have not been put into issue while the co-defendants occupied posi-
67. See, e.g., May v. Bradford, 369 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1963); Page v.
Hamilton, 329 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1959); Stutte v. Brodtrick, 259 S.W.2d 820 (Mo.
1953); Brantley v. Couch, 383 S.W.2d 307 (St. L. Mo. App. 1964); Schneider v.
Campbell 66 Express, Inc., 324 S.W.2d 363 (St. L. Mo. App. 1959); White v.
Kulinert, 207 S.W.2d 839 (K.C. Mo. App. 1948).
68. The rule of resjudicata in Missouri has been described as follows:
[M]aterial facts or questions which were in issue in-a former action, and
were there admitted or judicially determined, are ... conclusively set-
tled by a judgment rendered therein... become resjudicata and may not
again be litigated in a subsequent action between the same parties or
their privies, regardless of the form the issue may take in the subsequent
action, whether the subsequent action involves the same or a different
form of proceeding, or whether the second action is upon the same or a
different cause of action, subject matter, claim, or demand, as the
earlier action. In such cases, it is also immaterial that the two actions are
based on different theories, or instituted for different purposes, and seek
different relief.
Varnal v. Kansas City, 481 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1972). Res
judicata may apply in either of two ways: to the judgment rendered or to some
particular fact or facts litigated between the parties. Ratermann v. Ratermann
Realty & Inv. Co., 341 S.W.2d 280, 291 (St. L. Mo. App. 1960).
69. See, e.g., George A. Fuller Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 245 U.S. 489 (1918);
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 223 A.2d 79 (Del. 1966);
Sattelberger v. Telep, 14 N.J. 353, 102 A.2d 577 (1954); Wiles v. Young, 167
Tenn. 224, 68 S.W.2d 114 (1934); Snyder v. Marken, 116 Wash. 270, 199 P. 302
(1921); Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 318 (1969).
704 [Vol. 44
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [1979], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/4
1979] CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS
tions inimical to each other. 70 For the doctrine of res judicata to be ap-
plicable, the present parties must have been adversaries in the prior pro-
ceeding. Co-defendants do not become adversary parties merely because
each attempts to blame the other for the plaintiffs injury. 71 In such a
situation they are merely meeting an issue raised solely by the plaintiff and
not by either co-defendant.
Other courts, however, invoke res judicata to bar a separate action for
contribution even if a cross-claim was filed, if in a prior proceeding the
defendant from whom contribution is now sought was found to have been
not liable to the prior plaintiff. In American Motorists Insurance Co. v.
Vigen,72 the unsuccessful defendant was not allowed to relitigate the
liability of the successful defendant to the original plaintiff. The court
acknowledged that technically the co-defendants were not adversaries in
the original action. 73 Nevertheless, the court stated that when a co-
defendant for his own defense raises the issue with the injured plaintiff as
to the wrongful conduct of his co-defendant, then in effect the co-
defendants have become adversary parties. 7 4 Thus, the adjudication of the
issue in the original action is conclusive between them as to all later actions
for contribution.
One court has avoided the necessity of deciding this type of case on res
judicata grounds while reaching the same result as Vigen. In Liberty
70. See Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 318, 325 n.20 (1969). See also Page v.
Hamilton, 329 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1959) ("Absent filing of a cross-claim the rights
of the defendants inter sese would not have been adjudicated because ordinarily a
judgment in favor of a plaintiff does not determine the relative rights of codefen-
dants unless their hostile or conflicting claims are actually brought into issue by
pleadings and are litigated and determined."); Missouri Dist. Tel. Co. v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 336 Mo. 453, 79 S.W.2d 257 (1934) (mere effort of
one defendant to escape liability to plaintiff by throwing burden on co-defendant
does not make defendants adversaries of each other as required to render the
judgment against them conclusive as between themselves).
71. Missouri Dist. Tel. Co. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 363 Mo. 453, 79
S.W.2d 257 (1934).
72. 213 Minn. 120, 5 N.W.2d 397 (1942). The Vigen rule has had a
tumultuous existence. Its application was limited in Bunge v. Yager, 236 Minn.
245, 52 N.W.2d 446 (1952) (the rule in Vigen does not extend to cases which do
not involve the right to contribution or indemnity). The rule was reaffirmed in
Bocchi v. Kornstedt, 238 Minn. 257, 56 N.W.2d 628 (1953), and American Auto
Ins. Co. v. Molling, 239 Minn. 74, 57 N.W.2d 847 (1953). In 1962, the Minnesota
court admitted to having "no little difficulty" deciding cases under the Vigen
rule. Radmacher v. Cardinal, 264 Minn. 72, 75, 117 N.W.2d 738, 741 (1962).
The rule was questioned again in Anderson v. Gabrielson, 267 Minn. 176, 126
N.W.2d 239 (1964). The Vigen rule has been criticized for foreclosing the trial of
an issue which was not litigated by the parties to the contribution controversy.
Note, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors in Minnesota, 37 MINN.
L. REV. 470, 478-79 (1953).
73. American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Vigen, 213 Minn. 120, 5 N.W.2d 397
(1942).
74. Id. at 121, 5 N.W.2d at 398.
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Mutual Insurance Co. v. Curtiss, 75 the court denied the claim of a party
who sought contribution from his co-defendant who had been exonerated
of liability to the plaintiff in the prior proceeding. The court based its
denial on a determination that the co-defendants no longer shared a com-
mon liability to the injured party, generally an essential element in a con-
tribution claim. 76
The Missouri indemnity cases appear to indicate that the majority
view of barring the defense will be followed because those cases have held
that in the absence of the filing of a cross-claim, the relative rights of the
defendants between themselves are not determined. 77 The question is
undecided in Missouri because prior to Missouri Pacific it was necessary
that there be a joint judgment to obtain contribution in accordance with
statute.78 If a co-defendant was exonerated in the original action, that
precluded a joint judgment and in turn barred contribution. As observed
earlier, Missouri courts have refused to allow a defendant to appeal a rul-
ing or verdict favorable to his co-defendant when contribution rights
would be affected.7 9 If this rule is maintained, allowing the defense of res
judicata would preclude the unsuccessful defendant from ever recovering
contribution. While this may prove unduly harsh in some situations, it
should provide sufficient incentive for the filing of cross-claims in the
original action.
B. Allocation in a Separate Action
It is possible for the relative responsibility for the plaintiffs loss to be
determined in an action subsequent to the original lawsuit. This could oc-
cur when the trial judge orders a separate trial as to particular parties or
issues or when a defendant fails to use the procedural tools that force the
determination to be made in the original action. In jurisdictions which
base contribution on the relative fault of the co-tortfeasors, both of these
75. 327 So. 2d 82 (Fla. App. 1976).
76. If to speak of rights and liabilities under law is finally but a
prediction that the sovereign will dispose of competing interests
in a certain way, it is hardly possible to speak any longer of X
discharging a common liability of X and Y to Z when the
sovereign has said that Y is not and never was liable to Z. And
when a judgment has discharged Y of potential liability to Z, it
is nonsense for X to say, that by paying Z, he has conferred on Y
the benefit of nonliability to Z. No policy of Florida law re-
quires that the congested judicial system offer X an opportunity
to prove something which is not a fact and which cannot, by
any skill of advocacy, be made a fact.
Id. at 86-87.
77. See Page v. Hamilton, 329 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1959); Missouri Dist. Tel.
Co. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 363 Mo. 453, 79 S.W.2d 257 (1934); Kinlock
Tel. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 268 Mo. 485, 188 S.W. 182 (1916).
78. See note 2 supra.
79. See text accompanying note 68 supra.
,706 [Vol. 44
16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [1979], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/4
1979] CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS
situations have occurred.8 0 While there has been no attempt to preclude a
judge from separating issues or claims for different trials, there has been
discontent with allowing a defendant to choose to avoid having the con-
tribution issue determined in the original lawsuit.81 Some jurisdictions
have forced the defendant to make use of procedural tools such as counter-
claims and cross-claims to avoid a multiplicity of lawsuits and the resulting
inconvenience to the parties involved.8 2
The court in Missouri Pacific expressly sanctioned the use of separate
trials at the discretion of the trial court. The court stated that:
[W]hether or not a separate trial is required of the issues between
the third party plaintiff and third party defendant necessarily
depends upon the particular case. Economy of litigation and
avoidance of duplication of evidence, time, effort and expense is
essential in these days of increasing demands on limited judicial
resources, provided it is done without prejudice to the rights of
parties. 83
In Missouri a trial judge has the power to separate issues and claims for
trial if in his discretion he feels it is necessary.8 4 Also, by construction of
rule 52.11(a), a trial judge has been given the authority to completely deny
80. See, e.g., Sattelberger v. Telep, 14 N.J. 353, 362, 102 A.2d 577, 586
(1954); Greenberg v. City of Yonkers, 45 App. Div. 2d 314, 358 N.Y.S.2d 453
(1974) (separate trials at judge's discretion); Lipson v. Gewirtz, 70 Misc. 2d 599,
604, 334 N.Y.S.2d 662, 665 (1972) (separate action may be brought by
tortfeasor). See also UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG T ORTFEASORS ACT § 3a;
3J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE§ 14.06 (2d ed. 1948) ("it is no defense to an ac-
tion for contribution that plaintiff when originally sued by the injured party in
federal court failed to bring the defendant in as a third party").
81. In Meckley v. Hertz Corp., 88 Misc. 2d 605, 388 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1976),
the court stated that asserting a claim for contribution in a separate action should
be discouraged because it "adds to the burden of already crowded courts, creates
the possibility of inconsistent verdicts in the two actions and makes more difficult
the assessment of equitable shares in multi-party situations in which one of three
or more wrongdoers is not joined in the initial action." Id. at 609, 388 N.Y.S.2d
at 557, quoting Twentieth Annual Report of the Judicial Conference at 221
(1975).
82. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-17 (1968) (if party fails to cross-claim when
it is available, no independent action may be maintained for contribution);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2925 (1978 Supp.) (tortfeasor who satisfies all or part of
a judgment is not entitled to contribution if alleged contributee was not made a
party to the action and reasonable effort not made to notify him of the com-
mencement of the action); Rudolph v. Mundy, 226 Ark. 95, 288 S.W.2d 602
(1976) (must seek contribution from a party defendant in the original action);
Distefano v. Lamborn, 46 Del. 195, 81 A.2d 675 (1951) (Delaware statute pro-
vides that "if relief can be obtained as provided in this subsection no independent
action shall be maintained to enforce the claim for contribution.").
83. 566 S.W.2d at 474 n.8.
84. See MO. R. CIV. P. 66.02 (order separate trial for any claim, cross-
claim, counterclaim or third party claim in furtherance of convenience or to
avoid prejudice or where more conducive to expedition and economy); RSMO §
507.040(2) (1978) (order separate trials to prevent delay or prejudice).
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a third party claim. The rule provides the time limits and procedure for fil-
ing third party claims. 85 It has been held that "the right to implead is not
an absolute right even if the claim asserted is within the scope of Rule
52.11, but is a matter of discretion with the court. '8 6 The Missouri
Supreme Court has held that a trial judge has the discretion to strike a
third party petition even though it is filed within the ten day period for
which the rule provides an absolute right to implead. 87
The clear implication is that unlike a cross-claim or a counterclaim, a
defendant is not entitled as a matter of right to assert a third party claim.
Thus, even though a defendant may do all he can to have the relative
responsibility for the plaintiff's loss determined in the original action, the
trial court can order that there be a separate trial on the issue, or can com-
pletely deny the third party claim. In such a situation the defendant can
only seek contribution in a separate action.
The ability of a defendant to forego the opportunity to have the con-
tribution issue determined in the original action and choose instead to
resolve it in a separate action is generally recognized. 8 Only a few jurisdic-
tions deny this opportunity. 89 However, the consequences of a conscious
choice to seek contribution in a separate action may be so detrimental that
it will force the contribution issue to be raised in the original action.
Specifically, the failure to assert a third party claim or counterclaim could
result in requiring the defendant who now seeks contribution in a separate
action to carry the burden of proof as to the negligence on the part of each
of the joint tortfeasors and to relitigate all the issues tried in the prior pro-
ceeding. Some of the tortfeasors in the second action may not have been
parties to the first action and may not be bound by the determination in
the first action.9 0 Additionally, as previously discussed, if the defendant
85. MO.R. CIV.P. 52.11(a).
86. State ex rel. Gamble Const. Co. v. Enright, 556 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. App.,
D. St. L. 1977).
87. State ex rel. Green v. Kimberlin, 517 S.W.2d 124 (Mo. En Banc 1974).
88. See note 79 supra.
89. See note 81 supra.
90. It may be possible to avoid these consequences by the process of
"vouching in." In Listerman v. Day & Night Plumbing & Heating Serv., 384
S.W.2d 111 (Spr. Mo. App. 1964), the court stated that "[w]here one is bound to
protect another from liability, he is bound by the result of the litigation to which
such other is a party, provided he had notice of the litigation, and opportunity to
control and manage it." See also Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Rental Storage & Transit
Co., 524 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1975) (contribution plaintiff who settled
with original plaintiff after following "vouching in" process can obtain contrac-
tual indemnity without litigating question of its original liability to the plaintiff).
In other jurisdictions, the questions open to litigation among defendants in a con-
tribution proceeding generally depend on their participation at trial. Look v.
Toney, 245 Md. 42, 224 A.2d 577 (1965); Mickens v. Marascio, 58 N.J. 569, 279
A.2d 666 (1971); Cooperman v. Ferrentino, 37 App. Div. 2d 474, 326 N.Y.S.2d
675 (1971); Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 268 Wis. 6,
66 N.W.2d 697 (1954).
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fails to assert a cross-claim he may run the risk of being unable to appeal a
ruling or verdict favorable to his co-defendant and may find his separate
action for contribution barred by the defense of res judicata. 91 Thus, while
a tortfeasor may have the option to bring his claim for contribution in a
separate action, it is unlikely that he will wish to exercise it in light of the
possible adverse consequences which can result from such a decision.
IV. SUBSTANTiVE PROBLEMS:
DEFENSES TO AN ACTION FOR CONTRIBUTION
The defenses available to a tortfeasor from whom contribution is
sought fall into two general categories. The first focuses on the presence or
lack of particular relationships existing between the tortfeasors. The
defenses comprising this category deal with determining whether the par-
ties are joint tortfeasors, intentional tortfeasors, or have some other rela-
tionship. For the most part, courts have had little difficulty fashioning
rules applicable to these situations once they have overcome the defini-
tional hurdle. The second category of defenses available are based on
peculiar circumstances or relationships existing between the tortfeasors
and the injured plaintiff. It is this category of defenses which has produced
the most litigation and has given the courts considerable difficulty.
A. Defenses Based on the Relationship
Between the Defendants
The applicability of the Missouri Pacific decision is limited to joint
tortfeasors; 92 therefore, the initial defense a party should consider when he
is being sued for contribution is that he and the party seeking contribution
are not joint tortfeasors. Unfortunately, there has been confusion among
the courts in this country regarding the meaning of the term joint tort-
feasors. 93 At common law, joint tortfeasors were those who could be joined
in the same action because their wilful concerted conduct had combined
91. See notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra.
92. 566 S.W.2d at 468.
93. ProsserJoint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REV.413 (1937);
Comment, Contribution Among Tortfeasors: The Need for Clarification, 8 J.
MAR.J. PRAC. & PROC. 75 (1974). See also Germain, Remedies, Kentucky Law
Survey 1974-1975, 64 KY. L.J. 233, 244, n.61 (1975), where the author writes:
The term 'joint tort-feasors" really should be reserved for situations in-
volving concerted action or conspiracy between or among more than one
tortfeasor, whereas the term "concurrent tort-feasor" is aptly applied to
situations involving two or more tortfeasors whose wholly independent
acts concurrently caused an indivisible injury. Because true concurrent
tortfeasors are often "joined" as defendants in modern lawsuits, the term
'joint tort-feasors" has been used generally by courts, albeit somewhat
incorrectly, in reference to both types of tortfeasors.
1979] 709
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to produce the plaintiffs loss.9 4 American courts extended the term to in-
clude those whose negligent acts had concurred to produce the plaintiffs
injury.95 There is no Missouri case which defines joint tortfeasors. The
federal courts have stated that in Missouri the term is used to describe
those parties committing wrongful acts which are separate and distinct but
concur in a point of time and directly cause a single injury;96 wilful con-
duct is not required. Although no Missouri case has been found in which
contribution was denied based on the defense that the parties were not
joint tortfeasors, it should not be overlooked as a possible defense to a con-
tribution claim.
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, including Missouri,9 7
refuse to allow contribution among intentional joint tortfeasors9 1 In
Missouri Pacific, the court applied its holding only to negligent tort-
feasors.9 9 A defendant may avoid liability for contribution if he can show
that his own wrongdoing was intentional and that the wrongdoing of his
co-tortfeasor was intentional or even grossly negligent.10 0 Society's interests
94. Comment, Contribution Among Tortfeasors- The Need for Clarifica-
tion, 8J. MAR.J. PRAC. & PROC. 75, 78 (1974).
95. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 306.
96. Swope v. General Motors Corp., 445 F. Supp. 1222 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
See also Allen v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 992, 1004 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Mails v.
Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 51 F. Supp. 562, 564 (W.D. Mo. 1943).
97. Kansas City Operating Corp. v. Durwood, 278 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1960);
Avery v. Central Bank, 221 Mo. 71, 119 S.W. 1106 (1909); Eaton & Prince Co. v.
Mississippi Valley Trust Co., 123 Mo. App. 117, 100 S.W. 551 (St. L. 1906). The
award of punitive damages is often based on the defendant having exhibited con-
duct beyond mere negligence. Missouri courts have held that punitive damages
can be apportioned by the court among joint tortfeasors depending on the degree
of culpability or the existence of malice on the part of each defendant. State ex
rel. Hall v. Cook, 400 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. En Banc 1966); State ex rel. Kubatzkey v.
Holt, 483 S.W.2d 799 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972); Fordyce v. Montgomery, 424
S.W.2d 746 (Spr. Mo. App. 1968); Comment, Punitive Damages in Missouri, 42
Mo. L. REV. 593, 610 (1977).
98. See UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, 12 U.L.A. §
l(c) (1955); W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 310. This rule was well established at
common law. Recall that the no contribution rule credited to Merryweather v.
Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799), involved intentional conduct. See note 7 and
accompanying text supra.
99. 566 S.W.2d at 468.
100. See, e.g., W.D. Rubright Co. v. International Harvester Co., 358 F.
Supp. 1388 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Danberry, 234 Minn.
391, 38 N.E.2d 567 (1951); Roth v. Roth, 571 S.W.2d 659 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1978). Contra, Maryland Lumber Co. v. White, 205 Md. 180, 107 A.2d 73
(1954); Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24 (1954). The
1955 version of the UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § l(c)
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are said to be protected by the deterrent effect of this rule because
wrongdoers know that they "must not expect that a judicial tribunal will
degrade itself by an exertion of its powers, by shifting the loss from one to
the other, or to equalize the benefits or burdens which may have resulted
by the violation of every principle of moral and of laws."''1 Although the
deterrent effect of holding one party fully liable while permitting the other
equally culpable party to go unscathed has been questioned, 02 the rule is
firmly adhered to and has seldom been reversed when attacked as ineffec-
tual. 10 3
B. Defenses Based on Circumstances or Relationships Existing
Between the Plaintiff and One of the Joint Tortfeasors
A co-tortfeasor may have been responsible for part of the plaintiffs
loss but not be liable to the plaintiff because he holds a special defense,
such as family immunity, or has a release which serves to effectively bar the
plaintiffs action against him. The less fortunate co-tortfeasor, who enjoys
no defense to the plaintiff's claim, will find himself liable for the entire
amount of the plaintiffs loss. If the tortfeasor who was held liable for the
entire amount of the damages seeks contribution from the co-tortfeasor
who has a defense to the plaintiffs claim, the tortfeasor with the defense
will assert the defense and claim that he cannot be made to pay for the
plaintiffs damages indirectly when he could not have been made to do so
directly. Courts are thus faced with the dilemma of whether to allow a tort-
feasor to bear the plaintiffs entire loss or to allow the loss to be apportion-
ed among those responsible regardless of any special defense enjoyed by
one of them. To allow contribution is to extirpate the effectiveness of the
defense. To deny contribution is to force a tortfeasor to bear more of the
loss than he is responsible for and thus sanction an inequity sought to be
abolished by the rule allowing contribution.
The common liability requirement recognized by most jurisdictions 10 4
dictates that the plaintiff have an enforceable right against the tortfeasor
from whom contribution is sought, and that there be no contribution in
the absence of this right.10 5 The tortfeasor enjoying the direct defense
101. Bartle v. Nutt, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 45, 49 (1830); Reath, Contribution Be-
tween Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixan, HARV.
L. REV. 176, 179 (1898).
102. See Note, The Growth of Vicarious Liabilityfor Torts Beyond the Scope
of Employment, 45 HARV. L. REV. 349, 354 n.28 (1931).
103. Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24 (1954).
104. See, e.g., Highway Constr. Co. v. Moses, 483 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1973);
Walker v. Patterson, 325 F. Supp. 1024 (D. Del. 1971); Rowe v. John C. Motter
Printing Press Co., 273 F. Supp. 363 (D.R.I. 1967); Coxv. Maddux, 255 F. Supp.
517 (D. Ark. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 382 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1967); Ennis v.
Donovan, 222 Md. 536, 161 A.2d 698 (1960).
105. See Highway Constr. Co. v. Moses, 483 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1973) (con-
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would thus be protected as he would be by the Uniform Act which states,
"the common obligation contemplated by this act is the common liability
to suffer adverse judgment at the instance of the injured person, whether
or not the injured person elects to impose it."106
The court in Missouri Pacific in broad language indicated that it also
would require a tortfeasor to be subject to an enforceable action by the
plaintiff as a prerequisite to being subject to a contribution claim. 10 To
avoid harsh or unjust application, a court should in fact examine the cir-
cumstances of each of the various situations in which one of the tortfeasors
may not be liable to the plaintiff before deciding that contribution is not to
be imposed. 108
1. Statute of Limitations
In the majority of jurisdictions, if a plaintiff maintains a successful ac-
tion against a joint tortfeasor before the statute of limitations has run, that
tortfeasor can bring an action for contribution against a co-tortfeasor even
though enough time has elapsed so that the statute would bar an action by
the plaintiff against the tortfeasor.'0 9 It has previously been held in
Missouri that the cause of action for contribution and indemnity does not
arise and the statute of limitations does not begin to run until judgment is
entered against one of the tortfeasors and he has paid more than his pro-
portionate part. 110 Thus, the statute of limitations is applied separately to
the plaintiff's claim and the co-tortfeasor's claim for contribution.
tribution denied because of guest statute immunity); Oahu Ry. & Land Co. v.
United States, 73 F. Supp. 707 (D. Hawaii 1947) (government immunity);
Rodgers v. Galindo, 68 N.M. 215, 360 P.2d 400 (1961) (interspousal immunity);
Bond v. City of Pittsburg, 368 Pa. 404, 84 A.2d 328 (1951) (charitable
immunity); Cacchillo v. H. Leach Mach. Co., 111 R.I. 593, 305 A.2d 541 (1971)
(workmen's compensation); McKay v. Citizens Rapid Trans. Co., 190 Va. 851, 59
S.E.2d 121 (1950) (statute of limitations); Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. State Farm
Mut. Ins. Co., 268 Wis. 6, 66 N.W.2d 697 (1954) (contributory negligence);
Saxby v. Cadigen, 266 Wis. 391, 63 N.W.2d 820 (1954) (assumption of risk).
106. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORs ACT § 1(a) (1955 ver-
sion).
107. "[The] right to non-contractual indemnity presupposes actionable
negligence of both parties toward a third party." 566 S.W.2d at 468.
108. See Note, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors When One Tort-
feasor Enjoys a Special Defense Against Action By the Injured Party, 52 CORNELL
L.Q. 407 (1967).
109. See, e.g., Keleket X-Ray Corp. v. United States, 275 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir.
1960); Cooper v. Philadelphia Dairy Prod. Co., 34 N.J. Super. 301, 308, 112
A.2d 121, 123-24 (1955); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 86, Illustration 3
(1937); Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 925 (1951).
110. See Simon v. Kansas City Rug Co., 460 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. 1970). The
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The time period in which a tortfeasor can be held liable for the original
tort to the plaintiff by way of contribution can be substantially beyond
what it would have been if the statute ran concurrently on the plaintiff's
and the co-tortfeasor's claim. By starting the statute of limitations running
from the time of payment, a tortfeasor may find himself liable for con-
tribution many years after the plaintiffs actual loss. This could happen if
the tortfeasor seeking contribution had for a lengthy period failed to pay
the plaintiffs judgment, and the plaintiff continually renewed the judg-
ment until the tortfeasor paid. In order to avoid an inordinate lapse of
time in the bringing of such actions, the Uniform Act requires that all ac-
tions for contribution be brought within one year after the plaintiff has
been issued judgment.'
The purpose of the statute of limitations is to ensure the prompt settle-
ment of claims so that a claim will not be revived when evidence has been
destroyed and the memories of witnesses have lapsed." 2 It may be
necessary for courts to impose an arbitrary time period for the bringing of
contribution actions similar to that imposed by the Uniform Act."I s The
hardship of an arbitrary time period on an insolvent defendant who is
unable to satisfy the judgment before the time period allowing a contribu-
tion claim has run could be resolved by allowing him to notify the person
he will eventually seek contribution from that he intends to do so when he
has satisfied the judgment and thus toll the statute until after payment. " 4
A problem closely associated with the statute of limitations which is
bound to confront the Missouri courts is whether the Missouri Pacifc deci-
sion should be applied retroactively. The rule in Missouri for determining
whether to apply a case either prospectively or retrospectively requires that
a procedural-substantive test be utilized." 5 If the overruling decision is
one dealing with substantive principles, it is applied retroactively. If the
decision involves procedural matters, it is applied prospectively only. A re-
cent Missouri Court of Appeals decision held that at least as to apportion-
ment of damages and the rights of recovery among joint tortfeasors, the
111. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 3(c) (1955 ver-
sion).
112. See Exploration Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 435, 448 (1918);
Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 617 (1895).
113. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 3(c) (1955 ver-
sion).
114. Note, Contribution AmongJoint Tortfeasors When One TortfeasorEn-
joys a Special Defense Against Action By the Injured Party, 52 CORNELL L.Q.
407, 415 (1967). For an excellent discussion of situations involving insolvent tort-
feasors, see Myse, The Problem of the Insolvent Contributor, 60 MARQ. L. REV.
891 (1977).
115. Sheperd v. Consumers Coop. Ass'n, 384 S.W.2d 635, 640 (Mo. En Banc
1964); Barker v. St. Louis County, 340 Mo. 986, 104 S.W.2d 371 (1937); Koebel
v. Tieman Coal & Material Co., 337 Mo. 561, 85 S.W.2d 519 (1935).
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decision in Missouri Pacific affects substantive rights and, therefore, is to
be applied retroactively.1 1
6
The decision could be applied to any one of a number of past events.
First, it could be applied to any case where the injury, judgment, and pay-
ment of the judgment occurred before the decision. This would give the
decision complete retroactive effect and would open up a flood gate to
litigation involving what were thought to be closed cases. Second, it could
apply to cases where the injury and judgment may have occurred before
the decision but the payment had yet to be made as of the date of the deci-
sion. This would limit the "old" cases which could be reinstated to a far
greater extent than the first alternative. Another alternative would be to
limit the retroactivity of the decision to any case still in the judicial process
as of the date of the decision. This was the approach taken by the New
York courts when confronted with the same problem," 7 and limits to a
manageable amount the additional litigation engendered. To give the
decision a greater deal of retroactivity is to invite a significant increase of
litigation involving stale claims and the inherent problems of destroyed
evidence and forgetful witnesses." 8
2. Settlements
It is common for a wrongdoer and the injured party to settle their
dispute outside the judicial process. Typically, these settlements are ac-
complished by a release or a covenant not to sue. A release generally
discharges any further claims the injured party may have against both the
settling and the nonsettling tortfeasors." 9 In order to protect his rights
against the nonsettling tortfeasors, the injured party often executes a cove-
nant not to sue. A covenant not to sue is a contractual agreement by the in-
jured party not to enforce his cause of action against the tortfeasor to
whom the covenant was given; the other tortfeasors remain subject to the
injured party's claims. 120
116. Roth v. Roth, 571 S.W.2d 659, 672 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1978).
117. Liebman v. County of Westchester, 41 App. Div. 2d 756, 341 N.Y.S.2d
567 (1973); Hain v. Hewlett Arcade, Inc., 40 App. Div. 2d 991, 338 N.Y.S.2d 791
(1972); Brown v. City of New York, 40 App. Div. 2d 785, 337 N.Y.S.2d 685
(1972); Kelley v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25, 334 N.Y.S.2d 851
(1972). See also Augustus v. Bean, 56 Cal. 2d 270, 363 P.2d 873, 14 Cal. Rptr.
641 (1961); First Nat'l Bank v. Steel, 136 Mich. 588, 99 N.W. 786 (1904); Klaas v.
Continental S. Lines, Inc., 225 Miss. 94, 82 So. 2d 705 (1955).
118. Some courts refuse to give a new contribution rule retroactive effect.
Kansas City S. Ry. v. McDaniel, 131 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1942); F.H. Ross & Co. v.
White, 224 Ga. 324, 161 S.E.2d 857 (1968); Massey v. Sullivan County, 225
Tenn. 132, 464 S.W.2d 548 (1971); Norfolk & S. Ry. v. Beskin, 140 Va. 744, 125
S.E. 678 (1924).
119. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 301.
120. McDonald v. Goddard Grocery Co., 184 Mo. App. 432, 171 S.W. 650
(K.C. 1914). RSMo§ 537.060 (1978) allows an injured party to settle with one of
several tortfeasors without impairing the injured party's right to proceed against
714 [Vol. 44
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Numerous problems can arise when settlements and actions for con-
tribution become intertwined. One such problem occurs when a tortfeasor
settles with the injured party and obtains a complete discharge of all the
tortfeasors. The settling tortfeasor then seeks contribution from the other
tortfeasors who were not involved in the settlement. There is general agree-
ment among the courts which allow contribution that the settling tort-
feasor can obtain contribution from his co-tortfeasors who were not in-
volved in the settlement.121 It is usually held, though, that the burden of
proof is on the settling tortfeasor to show his and the other tortfeasors'
liability to the injured party, and that the settlement amount is
reasonable. 122 Allowing contribution in this situation is conducive to both
settlements and contribution.
Another problem arises when a release is given by one tortfeasor to his
co-tortfeasor. Typically, the driver of one car, fearing suit, settles with the
driver of the car he has collided with only to have a passenger in one of the
cars sue the first driver; the first driver then seeks contribution from the
the other tortfeasors. Therefore, the covenant not to sue is not the exclusive
method to protect the cause of action against the nonsettling tortfeasors, but it is
the safest approach. Missouri courts presume that a general release given to one
tortfeasor is a release for full satisfaction of the injured party's claim against all
the tortfeasors unless there is a specific and clear limitation of the scope of the in-
tended settlement. Swope v. General Motors Corp., 445 F. Supp. 1222 (W.D.
Mo. 1978); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. O'Brien, 330 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1960);
Liberty v. J.A. Tobin Constr. Co., 512 S.W.2d 886 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974);
Byers Bros. Real Estate & Ins. Agency v. Cambell, 329 S.W.2d 393 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1959). The presumption does not arise, however, when the acts of the tort-
feasors are independent. State ex rel. Normandy Orthopedics, Inc. v. Crandall,
581 S.W.2d 829 (Mo. En Banc 1979) (general release given to defendant-driver in
automobile accident does not bar subsequent action against physician for
negligent surgery following plaintiffs injury; extent of release is determined ac-
cording to intention of the parties).
121. See, e.g., Higgins v. Graves, 337 F.2d 486 (6th Cir. 1964); W.D.
Rubright Co. v. International Harvester Co., 358 F. Supp. 1388 (W.D. Pa.
1973); Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v: Lowe Constr. Co., 251 Iowa 27, 99 N.W.2d
421 (1959); Morris v. Koespelich, 253 La. 413, 218 So. 2d 316 (1969); Missouri
Pac. R.R. v. Reynolds Storage & Transit Co., 524 S.W.2d 898 (Mo. App., D.
Spr. 1975) (a prudent settlement is not a voluntary payment but rather is one
made out of legal compulsion and thus may be the basis for indemnity between
the settling and nonsettling tortfeasors); Harper v. Caputo, 420 Pa. 528, 218
A.2d 108 (1966); Swartz v. Sunderland, 403 Pa. 222, 169 A.2d 289 (1961); Mong
v. Hershberger, 200 Pa. Super. Ct. 68, 186 A.2d 427 (1962). Contra, Gentry v.
Wilmington Trust Co., 321 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Del. 1970); Rock v. Reed-Prentice
Div. of Pkg. Mach. Co., 39 N.Y.2d 34, 346 N.E.2d 520, 382 N.Y.S.2d 720
(1976) (§ 15-108 of the laws of New York provides that a tortfeasor who has ob-
tained his own release from liability shall not be entitled to contribution from any
other person).
122. See, e.g., W.D. Rubright Co. v. International Harvester Co., 358 F.
Supp. 1388 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Allied Mut. Cas. Co. v. Long, 252 Iowa 829, 107
N.W.2d 682 (1961); Duluth M & W Ry. v. McCarthy, 183 Minn. 414, 236 N.W.
766 (1931); Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d
512, 99 N.W.2d 746 (1959).
1979]
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released co-tortfeasor for the passenger's injuries. 123 It is not clear what ef-
fect such a release will have on the contribution rights of the releasing tort-
feasor when he becomes liable to an injured party who also could have held
the released tortfeasor liable. Courts that have considered the question
generally look to the language of the release to see whether it specifically
affected the right to contribution. If such a provision is contained in the
release, courts generally give it effect. 124
If there is no such provision, the court must determine if the "parties
contemplated that, in addition to releasing the obvious personal injury or
property damage claims, the tortfeasor-releasor would also surrender any
claims for contribution he might have against the co-tortfeasor-re-
leasee."' 25 Some courts find that the right to contribution accrues only
when the tortfeasor's common liability to the injured party has been
discharged, and any release executed prior to that time is not effective to
bar the subsequently arising contribution claim.126 Courts which deny the
claim for contribution find that the inchoate right to contribution comes
into existence at the time the injured party has a cause of action against the
tortfeasors. Therefore, the claim for contribution is in existence at the
time the release is executed and presumably it is within the contemplation
of the parties to include in the general language of the release any claims
for contribution. 127 Missouri courts have previously held that the right to
contribution is inchoate as of the time the tortfeasor's acts concur to pro-
duce the plaintiff's injury, 128 and would probably indulge the presumption
that a release of a co-tortfeasor before the complete right to contribution
has arisen is nonetheless effective to also release the contribution claim.
The typical contribution settlement conflict occurs where one of the
tortfeasors has settled his liability to the injured party in return for a
release and the nonsettling tortfeasors then seek contribution from him.
One response to this problem is to hold that the tortfeasor who settles is not
relieved from a contribution claim unless the release provides for a reduc-
tion of the judgment against the remaining tortfeasors to the extent of the
pro rata share of the settling tortfeasor.129 This can be accomplished by
123. For a discussion of the effect on contribution rights when a tortfeasor
releases a co-tortfeasor, see Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d 1374 (1970).
124. See 66 AM.JUR. 2d Release § 27 (1973).
125. Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d 1374, 1377 (1970).
126. Martin v. Guttermuth, 403 S.W.2d 282 (Ky. 1966); Restifo v.
McDonald, 426 Pa. 5, 230 A.2d 199 (1967).
127. Brown v. Eakin, 50 Del. 574, 137 A.2d 385 (1957); Norton v. Benjamin,
220 A.2d 248 (Me. 1966).
128. See note 43 supra.
129. See, e.g., Pilosky v. Dougherty, 179 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Pa. 1959);
M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mullin, 156 F. Supp. 445 (D. Ark. 1957); Theebald v.
Angelos, 44 NJ. 228, 208 A.2d 129 (1965); Garrison v. Navajo Freight Lines,
Inc., 74 N.M. 238, 392 P.2d 580 (1964); Blanchard v. Wilt, 410 Pa. 356, 188
A.2d 722 (1963); Palestine Contractors, Inc., v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764 (Tex.
1964). See also N.Y. Civ. PRAC. § 15-108(a) (1976) (a release reduces the claim
716 [Vol. 44
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what has come to be called a Pierringer release. 13 0
In Pierringer the plaintiff brought an action against six defendants for
damages caused by an explosion. Prior to trial all the defendants except
one settled with the plaintiff. Based on the releases they had received from
the plaintiff, the settling defendants moved to dismiss the nonsettling
defendant's cross-claim for contribution. The release the plaintiff had
given the defendants provided that the defendants were released from that
part of the plaintiffs cause of action for which each defendant's percen-
tage of negligence determined at trial would make each liable to the plain-
tiff, that the plaintiff reserved the balance of his cause of action against the
nonsettling defendant, and that the plaintiff agreed to indemnify the
defendants for any claim of contribution made by the nonsettling defen-
dant. 13' The trial court dismissed the cross-claim for contribution and the
Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed. 132 The court reasoned that the
nonsettling defendant had no cause to complain because he was relieved
from paying any more than what his share might prove to be. 133
If the settling tortfeasor pays for his release an amount in excess of the
share allocated to him by the jury, a problem arises as to whom the excess
should be credited. This problem was addressed by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in Daugherty v. Hershberger. 13 4 The court concluded that
the nonsettling tortfeasor was entitled to the credit, stating:
[I]f the proportion of reduction provided by the release is greater
than the amount of the consideration paid for the release, such
proportion of reduction prevails, but if the consideration paid for
against the others by the amount stipulated in the release, or the consideration
paid for the release, or the amount of the tortfeasor's equitable share, whichever
is greater). Section 5 of the 1939 UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORT-
FEASORS ACT provided that the release of any tortfeasor would not release him
from liability for contribution unless it expressly provided for reduction "to the
extent of the pro rata share of the released tortfeasor, of the injured person's
damages recoverable against all other tortfeasors." This provision was dropped in
the 1955 Act. See note 138 infra.
130. The release received its name from Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182,
124 N.W.2d 106 (1963). Two earlier Wisconsin cases set the stage for the accep-
tance of this type of release. Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105
(1962); Heimbach v. Hagen, 1 Wis. 2d 294, 83 N.W.2d 710 (1957).
131. Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d 182, 184, 124 N.W.2d 106, 108 (1963).
132. Id. at 188, 124 N.W.2d at 112.
133. Id. The court further observed that the settlement agreement should be
set out in the plaintiff's complaint and that in any event the defendant could "set
forth the facts of the release and such other pertinent matter" in his answer. Id.
134. 368 Pa. 367, 126 A.2d 730 (1956). Plaintiff settledwith defendant Mong
for $13,500 and gave him a release. The jury returned a verdict against defendant
Hershberger for $11,720. The court held that in order to prevent a double
recovery by the injured parties, the verdicts should be reduced by the amount
received in settlement. Thus, Hershberger's liability to the plaintiffs was only
$1,839 (the amount left unsatisfied by Mong's settlement) instead of $5,860 (one-
half of the $11,720 verdict).
1979]
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the release is greater than the proportion of reduction provided by
the release, then the amount of the consideration paid for the
release prevails. 
35
There are jurisdictions which deny the contribution claim of the
nonsettling tortfeasor even when the release does not provide for a reduc-
tion of the plaintiff's judgment to the extent of the settling tortfeasor's
allocated share. These jurisdictions reduce the judgment either by the
amount of consideration paid for the release, or by the amount the release
provides that the judgment is to be reduced, whichever is greater.1 36 This is
the approach taken by the 1955 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act. 137 In the Commissioner's note for the 1955 Act it is observed that "[i]t
seems more important not to discourage settlements than to make an at-
tempt of doubtful effectiveness to prevent discrimination by plaintiffs, or
collusion in the suit. Accordingly the subsection provides that the release
in good faith discharges the tortfeasor outright from all liability for con-
tribution." 3 8
Missouri's contribution statute contains a provision concerning the
situation where the injured party settles with one of the joint tortfeasors.1 39
135. Id. at 370, 126 A.2d at 733. A strong dissent was written by Justice
Musmanno in which he emphasized, "Mong recognized his fault in the motor col-
lision and promptly liquidated his financial responsibilities in the matter. That
he was generous enough to pay the subjects of his negligence more than the jury
later awarded them is not something for Hershberger to capitalize on." Id. at 373,
126 A.2d at 736. The apparent unfairness to Mong was alleviated in part by the
later case of Mong v. Hershberger, 200 Pa. Super. Ct. 68, 186 A.2d 427 (1962), in
which Mong brought a contribution action for $4,021, the difference between
$5,860, one-half of the jury verdict, and $1,839, the amount of the verdict paid
by Hershberger. Even though the settlement had not completely extinguished all
of plaintiff's claims against Hershberger, the court held a partial extinguishment
sufficient to entitle the settling tortfeasor to a right to contribution. Mong was
therefore allowed to recover contribution from Hershberger in the amount of
$4,021.
136. See, e.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 574 P.2d 763,
143 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1978); Atlantic Ambulance & Convalescent Serv., Inc. v.
Asbury, 330 So. 2d 477 (Fla. App. 1975); Ginoza v. Takai, 40 Hawaii 691 (1955);
Gronquist v. Olson 242 Minn. 119, 64 N.W.2d 159 (1954); Degen v. Bayman,
241 N.W.2d 703 (S.D. 1976). See also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-805 (Supp. 1978);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-42 (1953).
137. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT § 4(a) note (1955
version) (Commissioner's Comments).
138. Id.
139. RSMo § 537.060 (1978) provides:
It shall be lawful for all persons having a claim or cause of action against
two or more joint tort-feasors or wrongdoers to compound, settle with,
and discharge any and every one or more of said joint tort-feasors or
wrongdoers for such sum as such person or persons may see fit, and to
release him or them from all further liability to such person or persons
for such tort or wrong, without impairing the right of such person or per-
sons to demand and collect the balance of said claim or cause of action
from the other joint tort-feasors or wrongdoers against whom such per-
son or persons has such claim or cause of action, and not so released.
[Vol. 44
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This provision does not prevent a nonsettling tortfeasor from obtaining
contribution from a tortfeasor who has settled with the plaintiff. It seem-
ingly only provides protection to the settling tortfeasor from a further
claim by the plaintiff, while preserving the plaintiffs right to proceed
against the other tortfeasors. It is necessary, therefore, for either the courts
or the legislature of Missouri to decide if the settling tortfeasor should be
protected from a contribution claim. It is recommended that the settling
tortfeasor be afforded some protection because not to do so would
discourage the settlement of multiparty claims on an individual basis.
Separate tortfeasors would be unwilling to settle their liability with the
plaintiff if they feared their liability was not completely extinguished. 
140
Any possible prejudice which may befall the nonsettling tortfeasor by de-
nying his contribution claim can be alleviated, at least in part, by crediting
either the amount paid for the release, the amount stipulated by the
release, or the share of the fault attributable to the settling tortfeasor
against any amount for which the nonsettling defendants become liable to
the plaintiff. 141
3. Family Immunity
In Missouri a person may not maintain a civil suit against his or her
spouse during the marriage for a tort that occurred during the
marriage.142 Similarly, an unemancipated minor child cannot bring a civil
action against his or her living parents based on the parents' negligence; 43
140. See Berg, Comparative Contribution and its Alternatives: The
Equitable Distribution of the Accident Losses, 43 INS. COUNSEL J. 577, 590
(1976).
141. Although clearly the most favorable, a major drawback to using the set-
tling tortfeasor's pro rata share as the amount of the credit is that it forces the
plaintiff to bear the consequences of accepting a bad settlement offer. For exam-
ple, assume the plaintiff sues A and B and settles with A for $10,000. The plain-
tiff gives a release and stipulates that the judgment obtained against B will be
reduced by the percentage of fault attributable to the settling tortfeasor. The
plaintiff is risking a potential loss. If the jury returns with a verdict of $50,000 and
apportions negligence as 60% on A and 40% on B, the plaintiff would collect
$20,000 (40% of $50,000) from B; his total recovery would be $30,000 ($20,000
plus the $10,000 settlement) despite the fact that he obtained a $50,000 verdict.
Some argue that this secondary loss stemming from the settlement should
rightfully be borne by the plaintiff "since he [and not the other defendant] agreed
to the terms." Berg, Comparative Contribution and its Alternatives: The
Equitable Distribution of Accident Losses, 43 INS. COUNSELJ. 577, 590 (1976).
See also note 120 supra. The argument fails to recognize that this result will
discourage plaintiffs attorneys from settling their claims since "they have no way
of knowing what they are giving up." UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORT-
FEASORS ACT § 4(b) note (1955 version) (Commissioner's Comments).
142. Deatherage v. Deatherage, 328 S.W.2d 624, 625 (Mo. 1959); Brawner
v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 809 (Mo. En Banc), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 964
(1959); Noland v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 413 S.W.2d 530, 532 (K.C. Mo. App.
1967).
143. But see Fugate v. Fugate, No. 60,375 (Mo. En Banc, June 19, 1979)
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nor can the parents bring an equivalent action against their child. 144 Suits
among family members, it is argued, would disrupt the tranquility of that
relationship. 146 The policy reasons underlying family immunity conflict
with the policy of contribution if a joint tortfeasor seeks contribution from
a co-tortfeasor who is the spouse, parent, or child of the injured plaintiff.
The obvious question is whether the non-familial tortfeasor can force the
familial tortfeasor to assume responsibility for part of the loss by way of
contribution. The majority of states have refused to allow contribution in
this situation on the ground that there is no common liability between the
tortfeasors to the plaintiff. 1 46 However, the majority position is weakening
and the modern trend is to allow contribution even though one of the tort-
feasors enjoys the defense of family immunity. 147
The Missouri Supreme Court has declined to determine the related
issue of whether the defense of family immunity would defeat an indemni-
ty claim.1 48 Other cases in Missouri have shown a reluctance to allow the
defense when one family member brings suit against another family
member. 14 9 Therefore, it seems likely that Missouri will follow the growing
trend and allow a tortfeasor to obtain contribution from his co-tortfeasor
despite the fact that the tortfeasor asserts the defense of family immunity.
4. Workmen's Compensation
In Missouri, most employers are immune from common liability to
(parental immunity doctrine not applicable when child is emancipated or when
allowing the suit will not disrupt the family relationship).
144. Baker v. Baker, 364 Mo. 453, 263 S.W.2d 29 (1953).
145. Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68, 71 (Mo. En Banc 1960). See
also W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 122, at 859-64 (4th ed. 1971); Annot., 60
A.L.R.2d 1284, 1286 (1958).
146. See cases collected in 18 AM.JUR. 2d Contribution § 49 (1965); Annot.,
60 A.L.R.2d 1366, § 8b (1958).
147. Note, supra note 108, at 408; Note, Contribution Among Negligent
Tortfeasors: The New Rule and Beyond, 55 NEB. L. REv. 383, 397 (1976). See
also Wymer v. Dedman, 233 Ark. 854, 350 S.W.2d 169 (1961); Smith v. Southern
Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 247 La. 695, 174 So. 2d 122 (1965); Fisher v. Diehl,
156 Pa. Super. Ct. 476, 484, 40 A.2d 912, 917 (1945); Zarella v. Miller, 100 R.I.
545, 217 A.2d 673 (1966).
148. Crouch v. Tourtelot, 350 S.W.2d 799, 803 (Mo. En Banc 1961); State ex
rel. McClure v. Dinwiddie, 358 Mo. 15, 213 S.W.2d 127 (Mo. En Banc 1948).
149. See Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68, 73 (Mo. En Banc 1960)
(unemancipated minor allowed to bring suit against estate of deceased parent);
Wurth v. Wurth, 322 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. En Banc 1959) (emancipated minor
allowed to bring negligence action against parent); Hamilton v. Fulkerson, 285
S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1955) (wife may sue spouse for antenuptial torts). But see Ebel
v. Ferguson, 478 S.W.2d 334 (Mo. En Banc 1972), in which the court refused to
allow a spouse to sue after divorce for injuries negligently inflicted during the
marriage. The court also overruled Ennis v. Truhitte, 306 S.W.2d 549 (Mo. En
Banc 1957), which had allowed a surviving spouse to sue the estate of the deceased
spouse for negligent acts committed during the marriage.
[Vol. 44
30
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [1979], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/4
CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS
employees injured in the course of employment.1 50 Frequently an
employee will recover workmen's compensation benefits from his employer
and then bring a common law action against a third party whose
negligence concurred with the employer's to produce his injury. 5 ' If the
third party seeks to obtain contribution from the employer for his share of
the judgment of the common law action, the conflicting interests of the
workmen's compensation system and the contribution system are brought
into play. If contribution is allowed, the employer will be forced to pay in-
directly to the employee what he could not have been forced to pay direct-
ly. By denying the contribution claim of the third party, the third party is
forced to bear the plaintiffs entire loss even though the employer may be
equally or more at fault. Furthermore, the third party's payment to the in-
jured employee may end up subsidizing the employer's workmen's com-
pensation liability.152
Missouri's workmen's compensation law provides in part that:
Every employer subject to the provisions of this chapter shall be
liable irrespective of negligence, to furnish compensation under
the provisions of this chapter for personal injury or death of the
employee by accident arising out of and in the course of his
employment, and shall be released from all other liability therefor
whatsoever, whether to the employee or any other person. 53
Missouri courts have consistently held that an employee or a person claim-
ing through the employee does not have a common law action in
negligence against his employer once the employer becomes obligated to
150. See notes 155-56 and accompanying text infra.
151. See, e.g., Bunner v. Patti, 343 Mo. 274, 121 S.W.2d 153 (1938);
Reynolds v. Grain Belt Mills Go., 229 Mo. App. 380, 78 S.W.2d 124 (K.C. 1944).
RSMO § 287.150(1) (1978) specifically recognizes the right of an injured
employee to bring a common law action against a third party.
152. RSMo § 287.150(1) (1978) provides the employer a subrogation right
against the negligent third party which allows him to recoup all or part of the
workmen's compensation he has paid the employee. The third party action may
be brought by either the employer, the employee, or both jointly. Veninga v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Go., 388 S.W.2d 535 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965). If the employer
brings the action, he may recover even more than his compensation outlay; if so,
he can deduct his recovery expenses and pay the remainder to the employee to be
treated as advance payment of future installments. RSMO § 587.150(1) (1978).
See also Ruediger v. Kallmeyer Bros. Serv., 501 S.W.2d 56 (Mo. En Banc 1973);
Maryland Gas. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 418 S.W.2d 115 (Mo. En Banc 1967).
RSMo § 287.150(3) (1978) governs the distribution of the proceeds when the
employee brings the action. After deducting the expenses of the third party litiga-
tion from the recovery, the balance is then apportioned in the same ratio that the
amount paid by the employer at the time of the third party recovery bears to the
total amount recovered from the third party. Any pait of the recovery paid to the
employee or his dependents is treated as an advance payment by the employer on
account of any future installments of compensation. See Ruediger v. Kallmeyer
Bros. Serv., 501 S.W.2d 56, 60 (Mo. En Banc 1973).
153. RSMo § 287.120 (1978).
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furnish compensation under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act. ' 5 4 This holding is in line with the purpose of the Act, which "is to
provide a simple and nontechnical method of compensation for injuries
sustained by employees through accident[s] arising out of and in the course
of employment and to place the burden of such losses on industry."' 55
While the purpose of the Act is to benefit employees by giving them a
speedy and certain measure of damages for work-related injury, such a
benefit requires them to forego rights to obtain a common law measure of
damages. 5 6 In return the employer accepts absolute but limited
liability. 15 7 An attempt to increase the employer's liability to the employee
through contribution may be viewed by the employer as an unlawful ex-
pansion of the limited liability he originally bargained for and which is
protected by explicit statutory language.
Missouri has allowed a third party to recover indemnity from an
employer for the damages resulting from an injury to an employee. 55 This
154. See, e.g., West v. Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Mo.
1966); Montgomery v. Mine La Motte Corp., 304 S.W.2d 885 (Mo. 1957);
Gardner v. Stout, 342 Mo. 1206, 119 S.W.2d 790 (1938); State ex rel. National
Lead Co. v. Smith, 134 S.W.2d 1061 (St. L. Mo. App. 1939).
155. Bethel v. Sunlight Janitor Serv., 551 S.W.2d 616, 618 (Mo. En Banc
1977).
156. Leicht v. Venture Stores, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 401, 402 (Mo. App., D. St.
L. 1978); Seabaugh v. Garver Lumber Mfg. Co., 193 S.W.2d 370, 381 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1946), rev'd on other grounds, 355 Mo. 1153, 200 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. En
Banc 1947); Reed v. Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co., 236 Mo. App. 402, 405,
156 S.W.2d 747, 750 (K.C. 1941).
157. Leicht v. Venture Stores, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 401, 402 (Mo. App., D. St.
L. 1978).
158. McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh Painting Co., 323
S.W.2d 788 (Mo. 1959). The Missouri Supreme Court held that the defendant,
McDonnell, properly stated a cause of action in indemnity against the plaintiffs
employer, Hartman, even though the employer had already furnished compensa-
tion to the employee under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The court concluded that the obligation of the employer in undertaking to warn
its employees of the location of certain power lines resulted in a contractual agree-
ment between the employer and McDonnell which was sufficient to require the
employer to indemnify McDonnell. As the court stated:
We think the language of Sec. 287.120(1), "shall be released from all
other liability therefor whatsoever," means all other liability "for per-
sonal injury or death of the employee"; and does not mean liability for
breach of an independent duty or obligation owed to a third party by an
employer whose liability for injury to his employee is under the compen-
sation act. It seems unlikely that workmen's compensation acts were in-
tended to affect the rights of third parties outside the employer-employee
relationship .... Since such third parties receive no benefit from the
compensation act (as does the employer), therefore in the absence of an
express provision in the Act, it does not seem proper to hold that, by im-
plication, the Act has taken from them rights which they had before.
There does not seem to be any contention that the compensation act
would prevent the enforcement of an express contract indemnity ....
[W]e think it reasonable to rule that the Act does not prevent holding
[Vol. 44722
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result appears to rest on the principle of contractual rather than non-
contractual indemnity or contribution. Nevertheless, it does show some
willingness to narrow the immunity granted employers.
The question of whether a third party can obtain non-contractual in-
demnity from an employer was recently decided by the Missouri Supreme
Court in State ex rel. Maryland Heights Concrete Contractors, Inc. v. Fer-
riss. '-9 In that case, the defendant in a wrongful death suit filed a third
party petition against the employer of the deceased. In a four to three deci-
sion, the court held not only that the relative fault doctrine announced in
Missouri Pacific did not abrogate the immunity conferred upon an
employer by the Workmen's Compensation Act, but also that the
employer in this situation could not even be made a party to the cause of
action.
In his dissent, Judge Donnelly advocated the retention of the employer
as a third party defendant for the sole purpose of determining the relative
fault of all tortfeasors, but recognized that in no event could a judgment be
rendered against the employer "where judgment and recovery against one
of multiple defendants is legally barred."1 60 This would apply whether the
legal bar was in the nature of the Workmen's Compensation Act or "in the
form of a release given by the plaintiff to one of multiple defendants.1 161
Prior to Missouri Pacific, the issue of contribution between a third par-
ty and an employer could not arise since the contribution statute required
a joint judgment, which was impossible since the employee could never
join the employer with the third party in a common law action. 162 The
Hartman liable to indemnify McDonnell, for loss caused McDonnell by
the breach of its duty to McDonnell, which arose by reason of Hartman's
express agreement to assume and perform it. Such a ruling does not hold
the employer liable for personal injury or death of his employee but in-
stead holds him liable for the breach of an independent duty to a third
party which he expressly agreed to perform.
Id. at 796.
159. No. 61116 (Mo.'En Banc, Sept. 11, 1979).
160. Id., slip op. at 1. Judge Donnelly went on to state:
Inability to render a judgment against all multiple tort-feasors,
however, does not make it necessary that we narrow the application of
the relative fault concept in this case. The relative fault of Maryland, the
tort-feasor, against which there is no legal bar to judgment should still be
determined. In my view, a pure concept of relativefault requires that the
right of a claimant to recover from one tort-feasor be determined in ac-
cordance with a jury's finding of the respective percentages of fault as
between all tort-feasors.
Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).
161. Id. (emphasis added). The dissent cited State ex rel. Normandy Or-
thopedics, Inc. v. Crandall, 581 S.W.2d 829 (Mo. En Banc 1979) as a situation in
which the "purpose and function of a release would be circumvented if the re-
leased defendant could be held liable to other defendants for his relative fault in
causing plaintiff's harm." State ex rel. Maryland Heights Concrete Contractors,
Inc. v. Ferriss, No. 61116, slip op. at 2 (Mo. En Banc, Sept. 11, 1979).
162. See notes 155-56 and accompanying text sup5ra.
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majority of other jurisdictions which have addressed this issue have held
that non-contractual indemnity or contribution between the employer
and the third party is not allowed because of the limited liability afforded
the employer by the Workmen's Compensation Act.
163
The countervailing arguments generally advanced to deny contribu-
tion have been either that the Workmen's Compensation Act makes the
employer's duty to the employee exclusive, or that contribution could not
be allowed because there is no common liability between the employer and
the third party. 164 The basis for an "exclusive remedy" argument in
Missouri would be founded on the statutory language: "and [the employer]
shall be released from all other liability therefor whatsoever, whether to
the employee or any other person.' 6 This language has been relied upon
to find an employer's absolute liability and the employee's concomitant
guaranteed but limited recovery thereunder to be exclusive. 166 The argu-
ment has been attacked on two grounds. First, courts rejecting the "ex-
clusive remedy" argument have failed to accept that the trade-off between
the employer and the employee should affect the rights of third parties. 16
7
As these courts view it, while both the employer and the employee have
given up certain rights, they have also received benefits under the Act. In
contrast, the third party receives no benefits from the Act, yet it subjects
163. See Note, supra note 114, at 415; 18 AM. JUR. 2d Contribution § 48
(1965).
164. Dawn V. Essex Conveyors, Inc. 498 F.2d 921 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1040 (1974); Kessler v. Bowie Mach. Works, Inc., 501 F.2d 617
(8th Cir. 1974); Petznick v. Clark Equip. Co., 333 F. Supp. 913 (D. Neb. 1971);
White v. McKenzie Elec. Coop., 225 F. Supp. 940 (D.N.D. 1964). See also
Golden Valley Elec. Ass'n v. City Elec. Serv., Inc., 518 P.2d 65 (Alas. 1974);
Desert Steel Co. v. Superior Court, 22 Ariz. App. 279, 526 P.2d 1077 (1974);Jack
Morgan Constr. Co. v. Larkan, 254 Ark. 838, 496 S.W.2d 431 (1973); Hilzer v.
MacDonald, 169 Colo. 230, 454 P.2d 928 (1969); A.A. Equip., Inc., v. Farmoil,
Inc., 31 Conn. Supp. 322, 330 A.2d 99 (1974); Howard v. Steers, 312 A.2d 621
(Del. 1973); Kamali v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., 54 Hawaii 153, 504 P.2d 861 (1972);
Ashland Oil & Ref. Co. v. Bertam & Thacker, 453 S.W.2d 591 (Ky. 1970);
Lejeune v. Highlands Ins. Co., 287 So. 2d 531 (La. App. 1973), affd, 290 So. 2d
903 (La. 1974); Roberts v. American Chain & Cable Co., 259 A.2d 43 (Me.
1969); American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v. Mark Eng'r Co., 230
Md. 584, 187 A.2d 864 (1963); Vaughn v. Vakula, 38 Mich. App. 368, 196
N.W.2d 319 (1972); Ruvolo v. United States Steel Corp., 133 N.J. Super. 362,
336 A.2d 508 (1975); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Rota-Cone Field Operating Co., 84 N.M.
483, 505 P.2d 78 (Ct. App. 1972); Cacchillo v. H. Leach Mach. Co., 111 R.I.
593, 305 A.2d 541 (1973).
165. RSMo § 287.120(1) (1978).
166. See White v. McKenzie Elec. Coop., 225 F. Supp. 940 (E.D.N.D. 1964);
Golden Valley Elec..Ass'n v. City Elec. Serv., Inc., 518 P.2d 65 (Alas. 1974); Jack
Morgan Constr. Co. v. Larkan, 254 Ark. 838, 496 S.W.2d 431 (1973).
167. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143,282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d
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him to liability to the employee and the employer.1 68
The second ground of attack by the courts is premised on the statutory
language releasing the employers from liability to "any other person. 1 69
Rather than being read to cut off the employer's liability to all other per-
sons, it is asserted that the provision must be read in conjunction with the
rest of the language of the Act. Thus, it has been held to refer only to per-
sons who are allowed by the Workmen's Compensation Act to sue for the
injuries sustained by the employee. 170 Since a third party seeking contribu-
tion is not suing on behalf of the employee, he does not fall within the
scope of "any other person."17'
The lack of a common liability to the plaintiff is another argument
that has been urged by employers seeking to deny a contribution claim of a
third party. 7 2 Because the Act makes the employer immune from a com-
mon law action by the employee, there is no common liability (or ac-
tionable negligence) to sustain a contribution action. 73 Again, this argu-
ment fails to explain why the trade-off between the employer and the
employee should have any effect on the rights of the third party who has
received no benefits from the Act. 74
Among those jurisdictions that do allow contribution from an
employer, there is a split on the issue of the amount of recovery available to
the third party from the employer. Some allow the third party to recover
from the employer the same amount he would have been able to collect
from any other tortfeasor. 75 .Other courts have sought a compromise
between the employer's limited statutory liability and the equitable policy
underlying contribution which requires those jointly responsible for the
plaintiffs loss to discharge their respective shares. These courts have
limited the contribution recovery against the employer by allowing the
third party a set-off in the common law action brought by the employee up
to the amount of the employer's workmen's compensation liability, and the
employer is deprived of any subrogation rights he may have had against
the third party. 76
168. See cases cited note 156 supra. See also Larson, Workmen's Compensa-
tion: Third Party'sAction Over Against Employer, 65 Nw.U.L. REV. 351 (1970).
169. RSMO § 287.120(1) (1978).
170. Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349, 364, 63 N.W.2d 355, 365
(1954).
171. RSMo § 287.120(1) (1978).
172. Davis, Third Party Tortfeasors' Rights Where Compensation Covered
Employers Are Negligent-Where Do Dole and Sunspan Lead?, 4 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 571, 587-88 (1976).
173. See cases cited note 154 supra.
174. Davis, supra note 170, at 588.
175. See Larson, supra note 166. See also Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div.
Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d437 (1977); Dole v. Dow Chem. Co.,
30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
176. Santisteven v. Dow Chem. Co., 506 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1974); Brown v.
Southern Ry., 204 N.C. 25, 168 S.E. 419 (1940); Maio v. Fahs, 339 Pa. 180, 14
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-V. CONCLUSION
The Missouri Supreme Court in Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v.
Whitehead & Kales Co. greatly expanded a heretofore limited rule allow-
ing contribution among joint tortfeasors. Missouri Pacific adopts an
enlightened rule of allowing contribution between joint tortfeasors based
on their relative degrees of fault. While it advances a more equitable and
precise means of distributing economic responsibility for damages flowing
from a tort, application of the new rule presents a host of unanswered
substantive and procedural questions. Until Missouri courts resolve these
questions, an attorney should proceed cautiously to protect his client's in-
terests. Counterclaims, cross-claims and third party claims should be
utilized rather than having the contribution issue determined in a separate
action. This avoids the possibility that the contribution claim will be barred
by res judicata or that the court will not allow a separate action to be
brought by one of the tortfeasors. Finally, an attorney should urge the
court to consider the policy reasons underlying the principle of contribu-
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